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Abstract
Key predistribution schemes for resource-constrained networks are methods for allocating symmetric keys to de-
vices in such a way as to provide an efficient trade-off between key storage, connectivity and resilience. While there
have been many suggested constructions for key predistribution schemes, a general understanding of the design prin-
ciples on which to base such constructions is somewhat lacking. Indeed even the tools from which to develop such an
understanding are currently limited, which results in many relatively ad hoc proposals in the research literature.
It has been suggested that a large edge-expansion coefficient in the key graph is desirable for efficient key predistri-
bution schemes. However, attempts to create key predistribution schemes from known expander graph constructions
have only provided an extreme in the trade-off between connectivity and resilience: namely, they provide perfect
resilience at the expense of substantially lower connectivity than can be achieved with the same key storage.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we prove that many existing key predistribution schemes produce key graphs
with good expansion. This provides further support and justification for their use, and confirms the validity of expan-
sion as a sound design principle. Second, we propose the use of incidence graphs and concurrence graphs as tools to
represent, design and analyse key predistribution schemes. We show that these tools can lead to helpful insights and
new constructions.
1 Introduction
Key predistribution schemes (KPSs) are methods for allocating symmetric cryptographic keys to devices in a network.
Where resources are constrained, schemes are typically designed to provide a trade-off between three conflicting pa-
rameters. These are: the key storage requirement for each device, which should be minimised; the connectivity, or
sharing of keys between devices, which should be maximised; and the resilience, a measure of how often keys are re-
used throughout the network, which should be minimised. These parameters are widely used to analyse and compare
KPSs.
A KPS can be represented by a key graph, where vertices correspond to devices and edges represent the sharing of
keys. In addition to the three parameters introduced above, it has been recognised that the topology of the key graph
is also an important design consideration. In particular, it is desirable for the key graph to have good expansion [38],
which in essence means that all subsets of vertices are well-connected to the rest of the graph. The papers [17, 49] use
expander graph constructions to produce KPSs. The resulting schemes achieve an extreme in the trade-off between
connectivity and resilience: they provide perfect resilience at the expense of lower connectivity than is typically pro-
vided by a KPS with the same key storage. Briefly, the constructions in [17, 49] take an expander graph construction,
remove any self-loops and multi-edges, and then assign a unique key to each edge. Thus, each key is used to secure
exactly one link, and so perfect resilience is achieved. However, this also means that if a node stores k keys then it only
has degree k in the key graph. Other KPS constructions tend to re-use keys, such that a node which stores k keys will
often have degree significantly greater than k, and hence the network has higher connectivity.
In [38] it was shown that many existing KPSs with less-than-perfect resilience produce highly connected key graphs
with good expansion, thereby providing a more commonly desirable trade-off between connectivity and resilience than
is afforded by the strong condition of perfect resilience. We develop this analysis, proving that the key graphs of
many existing classes of KPSs have good expansion, which provides further support and justification for their use.
In particular, we prove lower bounds for the expansion coefficient of KPSs constructed from µ-common intersection
designs and strongly regular graphs.
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We also propose alternative graph methods for representing the key graph of a KPS. We show that the incidence
graph (or Levi graph / hypergraph) illustrates all the parameters of a KPS in one figure. This allows us to analyse KPSs
in a different way which leads to new constructions. We link these findings to analogous results in statistical design
theory using the concurrence graph, and discuss the use of optimality criteria from this subject in the setting of KPSs.
We begin in Section 2 by introducing the relevant background and definitions. In Section 3 we analyse the expan-
sion of existing KPSs, and in Section 4 we present alternative representations for KPSs and new constructions. Finally,
we conclude in Section 5 and present some open questions.
2 Background
2.1 Key predistribution schemes
We consider the distribution of cryptographic keys to networks of small, resource-constrained devices, or ‘nodes’.
Typically, such nodes are scattered over a large area to perform basic tasks such as monitoring or data gathering. The
limited storage and computational capacities of the nodes are an important consideration in the design of a scheme, in
particular meaning that any security must be provided by symmetric key cryptography, which requires less memory
and is less computationally expensive than public key cryptography. For the purposes of this paper, this simply means
that if two nodes are to communicate securely, they will need to store the same cryptographic key, and we examine
methods to achieve this.
A key predistribution scheme (KPS) is a method for allocating symmetric keys to the nodes of a network before they
are deployed into their chosen environment. A major drawback of KPSs is that once the keys have been predistributed,
subsequent key management operations are challenging to conduct [6]. See [16, 20, 47, 52] for surveys and details
of the many different approaches to creating efficient schemes. Here, it suffices to say that in order to make best use
of the nodes’ limited resources, it is usually desirable to minimise the key storage requirement whilst maximising the
connectivity and resilience of a network:
Key storage the number of keys which each device is required to store. This will usually be constant and denoted
by k.
Connectivity the probability that a randomly-selected pair of nodes are ‘connected’, denoted Pr1. This typically
means sharing a key, although in some schemes a pair of nodes are required to share more than one key before
they are allowed to communicate [18, 37, 39].
Resilience the probability that the set of keys used for communication between a pair of connected, uncompromised
nodes is known to an adversary which has compromised s nodes, denoted fails for 1≤ s≤ v−2, where v is the
number of nodes. This is a method for assessing the re-use of keys throughout a network. If each pair of nodes
is connected by a unique key then fails = 0 for all s, and we say the network has perfect resilience.
We now present a brief introduction to the relevant combinatorics and graph theory. The following definitions are
widely accepted throughout the literature and were compiled with reference to [7, 10, 14, 21, 35, 51], to which we refer
the interested reader for further details and examples.
2.2 Designs
The power set of a setX is the set of all subsets ofX , and is denotedP(X ). A set system (onX ) is a pair (X ,B)
whereX is a set andB ⊆P(X ). A combinatorial design (or, when the context is clear, a design) is a general term
used to describe a set system with some specified conditions such as regularity, uniformity or set intersection, as we
shall now explain.
In the context of combinatorial designs, the elements of the set X are called points and the elements of B are
called blocks. The degree of a point x ∈X is the number of blocks containing x. We say that (X ,B) is a regular
design of degree r if every point has degree r. The rank is defined to be the size of the largest block. If all blocks have
the same size, k, then the design is said to be uniform of rank k and is often called a block design. Note that we have
defined the blocks as sets, so that each point occurs at most once in each block; we consider only binary designs in this
paper.
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We usually add a prefix to the word ‘design’ to specify the properties of the set system in question, for example,
we define a t − (v,k,λ ) design to be a pair (X ,B) where |X | = v, uniform of rank k, and every set of t points is
contained in exactly λ blocks.
Combinatorial designs were first proposed for use in KPSs in [15]. A KPS can be constructed from a design by
associating a key with each point, and a node with each block. That is, node N j is given the set of keys {Ki : i ∈ B j},
where B j is a block in B. For example, see [47]. In Section 3 we will introduce some particular classes of designs
which have been used to construct KPSs.
2.3 Graphs
A graph G= (V,E) is a set of vertices V = {x1, . . . ,xv} and a set of edges E ⊆V×V . We use the notation (xi,x j)∈ E to
express that there is an edge between the vertices xi and x j, and we say that the edge (xi,x j) is incident to its endpoints
xi and x j. Wherever an edge (xi,x j) exists, xi and x j are said to be adjacent.
Unless otherwise stated, graphs considered in this paper will be simple graphs, that is, they are unweighted, undi-
rected and do not contain self-loops or multiple edges. These terms respectively mean that we do not assign different
weights to vertices or edges, edges are not directed from one vertex to the other, there are no edges from a node to
itself, and there is at most one edge between any two vertices.
Given subsets of vertices X ,Y ⊂V , the set of edges which connect X and Y is denoted
E(X ,Y ) = {(x,y) : x ∈ X ,y ∈ Y and (x,y) ∈ E} .
The complement X of X is the vertices which are not in X , that is, X =V \X .
An ordered set of consecutive edges {(xi1,xi2),(xi2,xi3), . . . ,(xi(p−1),xip)} in which all the vertices xi1,xi2, . . . ,xip
are distinct is called a path of length p− 1. We say that a graph is connected if there is a path between every pair of
vertices, and complete if there is an edge between every pair of vertices.
The diameter of a graph is the maximum ‘distance’ between pairs of vertices. That is, let D(xi,x j) be the length of
the shortest path between vertices xi and x j. Then the diameter of the graph is given by maxxi,x j∈V D(xi,x j). Finally,
the degree d(xi) of a vertex xi is the number of edges incident to that vertex. If all nodes have the same degree d, the
graph is said to be d-regular.
It is common to represent KPSs using simple graphs. We draw a graph of a network by representing the nodes as
vertices and the ‘connections’ as edges. That is, we associate each node Ni with a vertex xi. From now on, we will
refer to the vertex set using the notation V = {N1,N2, . . . ,Nv}.
To be precise in our analysis, we distinguish between the two possible types of ‘connection’ and consider the
separate constituent graphs of a network: the communication graph G1 = (V,E1) where (Ni,N j) ∈ E1 if nodes Ni and
N j are within communication range, and the key graph G2 = (V,E2) where (Ni,N j) ∈ E2 if Ni and N j share at least
q common keys. We say that two nodes Ni and N j can communicate securely if (Ni,N j) ∈ E1 ∩E2, that is if they are
adjacent in the intersection graph G1 ∩ G2 = (V,E1 ∩ E2). If nodes are to be scattered such that there will be no
control over the communication graph, the only way of affecting the intersection graph is through careful design of the
key graph [38]. It is therefore the key graph which we design and analyse in this paper.
There are multiple ways to construct a graph from a design, some of which we describe in Section 4. Unless
otherwise stated, we will refer to the graph of a design as the graph where each vertex corresponds to a block in the
design, and vertices are incident whenever their blocks have non-empty intersection. Thus, the graph of an r-regular
design will also be regular of degree r.
Finally, we define hypergraphs which can be considered as a generalisation of graphs, and which we introduce to
the design and analysis of KPSs in Section 4.
Definition 1. A hypergraph H = (V,E) is a set of vertices V = {N1, . . . ,Nv} and a set of hyperedges E. A hyperedge
is a subset of V of cardinality ≥ 2, written as (Ni1, . . . ,Nir) ∈ E, where r ≥ 2. If every edge contains r vertices, we say
that the hypergraph is r-uniform. Thus, a simple graph can be thought of as a 2-uniform hypergraph.
2.4 Expansion
For a thorough survey of expander graphs and their applications, see [25, 36, 38]. Here we introduce only the aspects
of expander graphs which are relevant to our study, and in particular we restrict our attention to edge expansion and
finite graphs.
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Definition 2. A finite graph G = (V,E) is an ε-edge expander graph, where the expansion coefficient ε is defined by
ε = min
S⊂V :|S|≤ v2
( |E(S,S)|
|S|
)
.
There is a related definition of an ε-vertex expander graph, which is defined in a similar way using the vertex boundary
of S. We have chosen to restrict our study here to edge expansion, as it is perhaps more intuitive for analysing key
sharing and is the measure used in the related literature on KPSs. Since we will be consistently referring to edge
expansion properties, we will omit the word ‘edge’ when the context is clear, for ease of notation. Another name for
the edge-expansion coefficient is the isoperimetric number, which is closely related to the algebraic connectivity, and
in a weighted graph where every vertex has the same weight, ε is equivalent to the Cheeger constant; see [23] for
further details.
Although the expansion coefficient ε is defined for any graph, the phrase ‘expander graph’ is used informally to
refer to graphs with good expansion, that is, graphs with a large value of ε . A large value of ε is desirable for many
network applications, which can be seen by the following observations:
• If ε = 0 then there exists a subset of vertices S ⊂ V such that E(S,S) = /0. This implies that the graph is not
connected. A graph is connected if and only if ε > 0.
• If ε is small, particularly if ε < 1, then there are sets of vertices which are connected to the rest of the graph by
relatively few edges. In a network, this can lead to vulnerabilities such as: communication bottlenecks; uneven
burdens on nodes, creating uneven battery drainage; a risk of being disconnected more easily by an adversary;
longer average path lengths / diameter between unconnected nodes.
• If ε is larger, then there is no ‘easy’ way to disconnect large sets of nodes and there is a more even spread
of communication burdens, battery usage and data flow. A graph with large ε will also have low diameter,
logarithmic in the size of the network [36] and contain multiple short, disjoint paths between nodes [40], the
many benefits of which were discussed in [38], where it is shown that ε ≤minx∈V d(x).
Thus, key graphs with good expansion are particularly desirable for resource-constrained networks, and the papers
by C¸amtepe et al. [17] and Shafiei et al. [49] propose KPSs based on expander graph constructions. Before we analyse
the expansion of KPSs in Section 3, we now explain how eigenvalues can be used to analyse the expansion of a graph
or design. We present two related methods: finding the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix, which provides a bound
on the expansion using spectral gap, and finding the eigenvalues of the Laplacian, which provide information on related
measures known in statistical design theory as A-, D- and E-optimality.
2.4.1 Spectral gap
For a d-regular graph G, we can define the spectral expansion of G using linear algebra. The following definitions are
compiled with reference to [2, 23, 25, 36].
Definition 3. The adjacency matrix of a graph G = (V,E) is defined to be a |V |× |V | matrix A, where each entry ai j is
the number of edges incident to both vertex i and vertex j.
It is easy to see that the adjacency matrix of a simple graph is a symmetric 0− 1 matrix, with zeroes on the main
diagonal. For a d-regular graph, the sum of the entries in each row or column is d. Since A is a real symmetric
v× v matrix, it has |V | = v real eigenvalues, λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ·· · ≥ λv, where all λi ∈ [−d,d]. In fact, it can be shown that
λ1 = d, corresponding to eigenvector u1 whose entries are all 1v . We also note that λv =−d if and only if G is bipartite
(two-colourable). We can now define the spectral gap as follows.
Definition 4. Let λ˜ be the largest eigenvalue in absolute value with |λ˜ | 6= d. Then the spectral gap of a d-regular graph
G is defined to be λ1− λ˜ = d− λ˜ .
The various definitions of expansion are closely related. We have that
d− λ˜
2
≤ ε ≤
√
2d(d− λ˜ ) , (1)
where ε is the edge expansion coefficient [1, 8, 19, 28, 29]. Thus, the spectral gap may be used as a measure of the
spectral expansion: the larger the spectral gap, the better the expansion of G. Finally, all large d-regular graphs satisfy
λ˜ ≥ 2√d−1−o(1) [46]. A graph is said to be Ramanujan if this bound is tight, that is, if λ˜ ≤ 2√d−1, and therefore
Ramanujan graphs have asymptotically smallest possible λ˜ , making them very good spectral expanders [25].
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2.4.2 Laplacian eigenvalues
Definition 5. The Laplacian matrix of a graph G = (V,E) is the |V | × |V | matrix whose (i, i) entry is the degree of
vertex i, and (i, j) entry (i 6= j) is the negative of the number of edges incident to both i and j. Thus it can be seen that
the sum of the entries on each row is 0, and in a simple graph, the (i, j) entries are either 0 or −1.
The Laplacian of a d-regular graph (similarly, of an r-regular, k-uniform design with d = k(r−1)) is defined to be
L = dI−A, where I is the identity matrix and A is the adjacency matrix (Definition 3).
The Laplacian and its eigenvalues can be used to determine various properties of a graph [4]. In particular, it is
proven in [4] that the second smallest Laplacian eigenvalue of a connected graph is strictly positive. Also known as
the algebraic connectivity, this eigenvalue corresponds to the second largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a
regular graph or design, and is therefore the eigenvalue of interest in the calculation of the spectral gap (Definition 4)
for regular graphs and designs. We will return to this method of analysing the expansion or ‘optimality’ of a design in
Section 4.3.
3 Analysing the expansion of existing KPSs
We observed in Section 2.4 that it is desirable for the key graph of a KPS to have a large expansion coefficient. The
expansion of an individual KPS can be found by studying its key graph. Here, we analyse three major classes of existing
KPS constructions: those based on expander graphs, random key assignment, and combinatorial designs. We note that
many existing KPS constructions can be considered as combinatorial designs, despite originally being described in
another manner [47].
We begin with those based on expander graph constructions.
3.1 KPSs made from expander graph constructions
C¸amtepe et al. [17] and Shafiei et al. [49] propose KPSs based on expander graph constructions. C¸amtepe et al. [17]
use a construction for a Ramanujan graph, which, as we saw in Section 2.4.1, is an asymptotically optimal spectral
expander graph. The construction they use is for network size v = p+1 and key storage k = q+1, where p and q are
primes congruent to 1 mod 4 (see [36]). Shafiei et al. [49] use the zig-zag construction for an expander graph, which
has the benefit of being more flexible to produce key graphs for any sizes of v and k. Both papers use the following
method:
1. construct an expander graph G for the appropriate network size and degree (and, in the case of [17], remove any
self-loops or multiple edges. The authors suggest that these be replaced with randomly-selected edges such that
all nodes have the same degree, though they omit this step from their example);
2. assign a unique pairwise key to every edge of G;
3. preload each node with the set of keys which correspond to its set of edges.
The key graph then has good expansion. However, we claim that it is possible to achieve higher expansion in a KPS
for the same network size and key storage, as we will demonstrate in the sections that follow.
3.2 Expansion of random KPSs
Random KPSs have been proposed in [32, 18], where keys are allocated to each node at random from a given key pool.
The connectivity and resilience depend upon the size of the key pool and the key storage per node, and, in the case
of the q-composite scheme in [18], an intersection threshold q > 1 such that nodes are only connected if they share at
least q keys.
Connected Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs G(v, p) [31] are good expanders with high probability [36]. As noted
in [6, 27, 53], the random KPS of Eschenauer and Gligor [32] produces a key graph which is more highly connected
than the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph G(v,Pr1). Therefore random KPSs produce key graphs with good expansion with high
probability.
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3.3 Expansion of combinatorial designs
Many deterministic KPS constructions are based on combinatorial designs; see [47] for a unifying survey. Here provide
analysis for some of these constructions and prove lower bounds on the expansion of their corresponding key graphs.
Many of the designs proposed for use in KPSs have the property of being configurations.
Definition 6. (from [44, Definition 1.2]) A design (X ,B) with |X |= n, |B| = v is called a (n,v,r,k)-configuration
if it is regular of degree r, uniform of rank k and any two points occur in at most one block.
More information on configurations can be found in [24, 44]. We note here that the key graph of a configuration is
regular:
Lemma 1. (from [44, Lemma 1.1]) The key graph of a (n,v,r,k)-configuration is regular of degree k(r−1). This is the
maximum possible degree of a graph of a (n,v,r,k)-design.
We restrict our study of the expansion of designs to configurations, where the regularity of the key graph will
simplify some of the analysis. First we provide an estimate of the expansion of a regular, uniform configuration.
Lemma 2. For an (n,v,r,k)-configuration, the edge-expansion coefficient can be estimated by
ε ≈ k(r−1)
2
.
Proof. In the key graph of an (n,v,r,k)-configuration, the degree of a node is k(r− 1) (Lemma 1). Thus, for a set of
nodes S⊂V ,
E(S,S) = |S|k(r−1)−2E(S,S),
where E(S,S) counts the number of edges whose endpoints are both in S. The factor of two is needed because the
‘|S|k(r−1)’ term has counted each of these edges twice.
We now need to find an expression for E(S,S). Let Na and Nb be nodes in S, and letKa andKb be their respective
key sets, each of size k. For simplicity of notation, label the keys in Ka as K1, . . . ,Kk and define random variables Xi
for 1≤ i≤ k so that
Xi =
{
1 if key Ki ∈Kb
0 otherwise .
Then X := ∑ki=1 Xi counts the number of edges between Na and Nb.
The expected value of Xi, which we will write as Ex[Xi] to avoid confusion with the edge notation, is given by
Ex[Xi] =
r−1
v−1 ,
since there are r−1 other nodes which know key Ki, out of a total of v−1 other nodes in the network. By linearity of
expectation,
Ex[X ] = kEx[Xi] =
k(r−1)
v−1 .
Thus the expected number of edges amongst |S| nodes is (|S|2 ) k(r−1)v−1 , hence
Ex[E(S,S)] = |S|k(r−1)−2
(|S|
2
)
k(r−1)
v−1
= |S|k(r−1)
[
1− |S|−1
v−1
]
.
Finally, since ε = min
1≤|S|≤ v2
|E(S,S)|
|S| , this gives
ε ≈ min
1≤|S|≤ v2
{
k(r−1)
[
1− |S|−1
v−1
]}
= k(r−1)
[
1− b
v
2c−1
v−1
]
≈ k(r−1)
2
for large v.
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Lemma 2 tells us that the expected value of the expansion coefficient of a configuration-based KPS is good, since in
particular k(r−1)2 > 1 for practical values of k and r. However, Lemma 2 does not guarantee good expansion: consider
for example the design (X ,B) where X = {1,2,3,4,5,6}, B = {{1,2},{2,3},{1,3},{4,5},{5,6},{4,6}} which
is a (6,6,2,2)-configuration but is disconnected and has expansion ε = 0.
To successfully construct a KPS from a configuration, we clearly require the graph of the configuration to be
connected. In addition to being k-uniform and r-regular, configurations which are proposed as constructions for KPSs
generally have further properties which guarantee connectedness. We demonstrate examples of these properties in
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, where we give a brief overview of two classes of configurations which have been proposed
as constructions for KPSs, namely µ-common intersection designs and strongly regular graphs, and we prove lower
bounds for their expansion parameters.
3.3.1 µ-common intersection designs
A class of configurations called µ-common intersection designs were defined by Lee and Stinson in [43, 44].
Definition 7. Let (X ,B) be a (n,v,r,k)-configuration. We say that (X ,B) is a µ-common intersection design if for
blocks Bi and B j,
Bi∩B j = /0 =⇒ |
{
Bk ∈B : Bi∩Bk 6= /0 and B j ∩Bk 6= /0
} | ≥ µ.
In terms of the key graph of a KPS, this means that if nodes Ni and N j corresponding to blocks Bi and B j do not
share any keys and so are not adjacent, then they have at least µ common neighbours, i.e. µ nodes with which they
both share a key.
In [44], the motivation given for using µ-common intersection designs for KPSs is that if two nodes Ni and N j wish
to communicate but do not share a common key, then they can communicate via ‘two hops’ if they share at least one
common neighbour. It is widely recognised that common neighbours can be beneficial for updating, ‘reinforcing’ and
establishing new keys, and routing messages between nodes which do not share a common key [18, 26, 30]. We now
show that having diameter 2 provides a good lower bound on the expansion of a graph, providing further support for
the use of KPSs with ‘two hop paths’.
Lemma 3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with diameter 2. Then for any subset S, where /0 6= S⊂V ,
|E(S,S)| ≥min{|S||S|}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that |S| ≤ |S|. Now, suppose for a contradiction that |E(S,S)|<min{|S||S|},
that is, suppose |E(S,S)|< |S|. Then there exists a node Ni ∈ S which is not adjacent to any node in S. Denote the set of
nodes adjacent to Ni by VNi . We have that VNi ⊆ S, and so E(VNi ,S)⊆ E(S,S). Thus |E(VNi ,S)| ≤ |E(S,S)|< |S| ≤ |S|,
and so there exists a node N j ∈ S which is not adjacent to any node in VNi . This contradicts the property that the graph
has diameter 2, since Ni and N j do not have a common neighbour.
Corollary 1. The graph G = (V,E) of a µ-common intersection design is an ε-expander graph, where ε ≥ 1.
Proof. Since the graph of a µ-common intersection design has diameter 2, this is a simple consequence of Lemma 3.
By definition, the expansion coefficient is given by
ε = min
S⊂V :|S|≤ v2
{ |E(S,S)|
|S|
}
≥ min
S⊂V :|S|≤ v2
{ |S|
|S|
}
≥ 1.
Therefore we have shown that µ-common intersection designs are a natural choice for KPSs, not only because of
the ‘two-hop paths’ property mentioned in [44], but also because they have expansion of at least ε = 1.
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3.3.2 Strongly regular graphs
Strongly regular graphs may be regarded as a special type of µ-common intersection design, and are defined as follows.
Definition 8. (from [13]) A (v,k(r−1),λ ,µ)-strongly regular graph is a graph on v vertices which is regular of degree
k(r−1) and has the following properties:
• any two adjacent vertices have exactly λ common neighbours
• any two nonadjacent vertices have exactly µ common neighbours.
Equivalently, the design (X ,B) is a strongly regular graph if it is regular of degree r, uniform of rank k, and for
blocks Bi and B j,
Bi∩B j 6= /0 =⇒ |
{
Bk ∈B : Bi∩Bk 6= /0 and B j ∩Bk 6= /0
} |= λ
and
Bi∩B j = /0 =⇒ |
{
Bk ∈B : Bi∩Bk 6= /0 and B j ∩Bk 6= /0
} |= µ .
Strongly regular graphs have been shown to exist for various combinations of the parameters v, k and r in [42].
Constructions are given in [13, 50, 44] and we refer the reader to [12] for a discussion on constructing random strongly
regular graphs.
In addition to Lemma 3 we have another lower bound for strongly regular graphs:
Lemma 4. For a connected (v,k(r−1),λ ,µ) strongly regular graph,
ε ≥ k(r−1)
2
− λ −µ+
√
(λ −µ)2+4(k(r−1)−µ)
4
.
Proof. In [11] it is shown that the non-trivial eigenvalues of a strongly regular graph are the solutions of the equation
x2− (λ −µ)x+(k(r−1)−µ) = 0 .
Thus the larger root is given by
λ˜ =
λ −µ+
√
(λ −µ)2+4(k(r−1)−µ)
2
and, using Equation (1), we have our result.
In Section 4.2.2 we will see an example of a strongly regular graph as a KPS, and we will use Lemma 4 to show
that its expansion is in fact significantly greater than 1.
4 Studying, constructing and analysing KPSs using alternative graph meth-
ods
In this section we discuss alternative graphical representations of the key graph of a KPS. We argue that these repre-
sentations provide important benefits, namely:
1. the incidence graph enables us to recover all the details of a KPS;
2. the incidence graph suggests new approaches for constructing KPSs;
3. the concurrence graph and incidence graph together enable us to perform further analysis using statistical design
theory.
We consider these benefits in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
4.1 Representation of a KPS using the incidence graph
It is common in the literature to represent the key graph of a KPS in the way described in Section 2.3, where vertices
correspond to nodes and edges correspond to shared keys. From now on we will call this the block intersection graph
of a KPS, corresponding to the common terminology in combinatorial design theory. As far as we are aware, no
other graphical representions have been used for KPSs. We suggest that representing a KPS using an incidence graph
can have advantages over the block intersection graph representation, namely by demonstrating the key storage and
resilience of the KPS in addition to the connectivity, as we now explain with reference to two motivating examples.
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4.1.1 Example 1: trivial KPSs
Consider Figure 1, which shows (with labels) the block intersection graphs of two trivial KPSs on four nodes. Fig-
ure 1(a) represents a KPS where every node stores a single key, K, and Figure 1(b) represents a KPS where each pair of
nodes is assigned a unique key. Notice that both graphs are complete, despite the difference in their resilience. Without
the edge labels (which would be infeasible to draw on a large graph) the graphs would be isomorphic, and thus the
important metrics of key storage and resilience are not be represented.
K
K
K
K
K
K
(a) Each node is assigned a single
key, K
K1
K2
K3
K4
K5
K6
(b) Every pair of nodes is assigned a
unique key
Figure 1: Trivial KPSs represented by block intersection graphs
(a) Each node is assigned a single
key, K
(b) Every pair of nodes is assigned a
unique key
Figure 2: Incidence graph representations of trivial key predistribution schemes
In Figure 2 we represent the same two KPSs in a different way. Nodes are again represented as black vertices, but
we now introduce white vertices which correspond to keys. There is an edge between a key vertex Ki and node vertex
v j if and only if the key Ki is known to node v j. This representation can be thought of in numerous ways, including the
incidence or Levi graph of a design [45], often referred to as a bipartite graph on the node and key vertices, and/or a
hypergraph, as we will explain in more detail in Section 4.2.
We observe that the incidence graph representation in Figure 2 demonstrates the key storage k and the number of
nodes which store each key (or ‘key repetition’) r: we see from the degrees of the node vertices that k= 1 in Figure 2(a)
and k = 3 in Figure 2(b), and from the degrees of the key vertices that r = 4 in Figure 2(a) and r = 2 in Figure 2(b)),
which immediately tells us that the resilience is worst possible in Figure 2(a) and best possible in Figure 2(b).
4.1.2 Example 2: a KPS from a configuration
We now consider another, less extreme example. Consider the 2− (9,3,1) configuration: X = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}
andB = {{123}, {456},{789},{147},{258},{369},{159},{267},{348},{168},{249},{357}}, which can be con-
sidered as a KPS where points correspond to keys and each block corresponds to a node’s key set. The block intersection
graph of this KPS (with key labels) is given in Figure 3. For comparison, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show two isomorphic
representations of the incidence graph. These representations respectively appeal to the hypergraph and bipartite ways
of thinking about the incidence graph.
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{123}
{456}
{789}
{147}
{258}
{369}
{159}
{267}
{348}
{168}
{249}
{357}
Figure 3: Block intersection graph of a 2− (9,3,1) configuration
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
N10
N11
N12
1
2
3 4
5
6
7
8
9
(a)
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
N10
N11
N12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
(b)
Figure 4: The incidence graph of a 2− (9,3,1) design; two isomorphic representations with different arrangements of
the vertices
Figure 3 clearly demonstrates the connectivity: each node is connected to nine other nodes, hence Pr1 = 911 ≈ 0.818.
However, without the key labels it would not be possible to determine k and r with certainty. By contrast, Figures 4(a)
and 4(b) demonstrate clearly that k = 3 (node vertex degree) and r = 4 (key vertex degree / hyperedges uniformly
incident to four vertices). A simple calculation of k(r− 1) = 3× 3 = 9 tells us that each node shares a key with nine
other nodes, and hence the connectivity of the KPS is Pr1 = 911 . Key labels are included in Figure 4 for clarity, but
notice that they are not needed for these calculations.
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Finally, we note that it is straightforward to produce the incidence graph representation of a combinatorial design
via its incidence matrix, as each row corresponds to a key (hyperedge):
Definition 9. The incidence matrix M of a design is a matrix where the columns represent blocks (nodes), rows
represent points (keys), and whose entries are given by mi j =
{
1 if point i is in block j
0 otherwise
.
In summary, without key labels, a block intersection graph only provides an exact representation of the connectivity
of a KPS, whereas the incidence graph, which is easy to construct, unambiguously represents the connectivity, key
storage and resilience:
1. the degree of a node vertex is equal to the number of keys stored by that node, k;
2. the degree of a key vertex, r, demonstrates the number of nodes which store that key, allowing us to calculate the
resilience;
3. the connectivity is given by k(r−1)v−1 .
4.2 Incidence graph constructions for KPSs
In addition to providing a helpful visual representation of a key graph, the incidence graph can help us to consider
further constructions for KPSs. That is, it helps to illustrate that one can consider a KPS both as an assignment of keys
to nodes, and as an assignment of nodes to keys. We now consider the incidence graph as a hypergraph and show how
this perspective leads to further KPS constructions.
4.2.1 Hypergraphs
Hypergraphs are a generalisation of graphs, where each edge may be incident to more than two vertices. There are
various equivalent ways to draw hyperedges: Figure 5(a) demonstrates perhaps the more intuitive method, where a
hyperedge ‘contains’ its vertices; Figure 5(b) uses the convention of drawing each hyperedge as a new (white) vertex,
adjacent to its set of incident (black) vertices. The latter method is equivalent to the incidence graph method given in
Section 4.1, where hyperedges correspond to keys and black vertices correspond to nodes.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Graph and hypergraph representations of a simple KPS
Notice that, since a (hyper)graph G = (V,E) is defined by its vertex set V and (hyper)edge set E, a (hyper)graph is
a set system. An r-uniform hypergraph is a set system which is uniform of rank r. Further, as we now demonstrate,
the hypergraph representation of a combinatorial design can be a regular, uniform design itself. Indeed, the hypergraph
H = (V,E) from Figure 4(a) is given by V = {1,2, . . . ,12}, and
E = {{1,4,7,10},{1,5,8,11},{1,6,9,12},{2,4,9,11},{2,5,7,12},
{2,6,8,10},{3,4,8,12},{3,5,9,10},{3,6,7,11}}.
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Regarding H = (V,E) as a combinatorial design, that is, regarding the hyperedges as blocks, we see that this design
is regular of degree 3, uniform of rank 4, and has incidence matrix Mt , the transpose of the incidence matrix M of the
original 2− (9,3,1) configuration.
We propose the use of hypergraphs for constructing KPSs by making the following observation. The KPSs given
in [17, 49] have perfect resilience and good expansion but rather low connectivity for the key storage. If their methods
could be adapted so that they did not produce KPSs with perfect resilience, they might provide further good construc-
tions for KPSs with trade-offs between all three parameters. A naı¨ve approach to such an adaptation would be to take
an expander graph construction for a KPS and simply assign the same key to multiple edges. However, it is not entirely
clear how best to do this. One way would be to create the expander graph as in [17] or [49], pick a node at random,
and assign a key K1 to two of its edges, repeat for a key K2, etc. However, such an approach could lead to unneces-
sarily high key storage for some nodes, whilst others receive comparatively few keys. In addition, an expander graph
with higher connectivity than in [17, 49] should be picked in the first place, as otherwise we would be reducing the
resilience whilst maintaining the same connectivity. It is not immediately obvious how many edges the initial expander
construction should have in order to maintain a similar magnitude of key storage and maintain a desirable trade-off
between connectivity and resilience. Therefore, whilst this method may have merit, we demonstrate a ‘tidier’ solution:
we construct KPSs from hypergraphs with good expansion, thereby creating KPSs with good expansion where each
key is known to r > 2 nodes.
4.2.2 Hypergraph KPS constructions
The literature on hypergraphs with good expansion (sometimes called ‘expanding hypergraphs’) is limited. In [34], the
notion of eigenvalues of a graph is extended to hypergraphs, and thus Friedman et al. are able to analyse the second
eigenvalue of a hypergraph. This allows them to carry over the concept from graph theory of a spectral expander
graph being one with large spectral gap (Section 2.4.1). They prove many theorems about the properties of such
expanding hypergraphs, and provide a construction, namely Cayley hypergraphs. Whilst they demonstrate that Cayley
hypergraphs have good expansion, they also note that the expansion of a general Cayley hypergraph is far from the
optimal bounds which are proven in the paper.
There is currently no known method for generating uniform hypergraphs at random [36]. If there were, they would
likely provide a very promising way of constructing KPSs, since it is proven in [34] that a random uniform hypergraph
has good expansion with high probability.
In [48] two further approaches to constructions of hypergraphs with good expansion are given: explicit construc-
tions from Gower’s Theorem, and semi-explicit constructions from Fourier Analysis. However, in order to provide
a simple demonstration of the method of constructing a KPS from a hypergraph, we will use the Cayley hypergraph
construction from [33] which has good (though far from optimal) expansion, and we will compare its effectiveness as
a construction for a KPS to the construction from [17] based on a Ramanujan expander graph.
Definition 10. Let V be a group, and W ⊂V . The 3-uniform Cayley hypergraph on V and W is the hypergraph whose
vertices are the elements of V and whose hyperedge set is given by
E = {(x,y,z) : x,y,z distinct, xyz ∈W}.
Remark 1. We note that, to the best of our knowledge, the earliest definition of a Cayley hypergraph is given in [33],
as an extension of the widely-known definition of a Cayley graph (or 2-hypergraph). It is stated as the definition of
a ‘3-regular’ Cayley hypergraph on V and W . However, the word ‘regular’ is more commonly used to mean that the
number of (hyper)edges incident to each node is constant. This is not necessarily the case in Cayley hypergraphs (as
we will demonstrate below) and indeed there will generally be more than three hyperedges incident to each node. We
therefore use the word ‘uniform’ for consistency with the recent literature.
In addition, for the hypergraph to be 3-uniform we have required that x 6= y 6= z 6= x. Otherwise, hyperedges of the
form (x,x,z) and (x,x,x) would be included, which are not usually considered to be 3-edges. This is not stated in the
definition in [33].
In the example given in [17], a KPS is created for 18 nodes from a Ramanujan expander graph. We reproduce their
key graph in Figure 6. Each node stores 4, 5 or 6 keys, and there are 46 keys used in total, each securing exactly one
link. Thus we have fails = 0 for all s≤ 16 and Pr1 = 46(182 ) =
46
153 ≈ 0.3.
For a direct comparison, we construct a KPS for 18 nodes using a 3-uniform Cayley hypergraph (Figure 7). We use
the group V = (Z18,+) with W = 0, giving the vertices {0,1, . . . ,17} and hyperedges
E = {(x,y,z) : x,y,z distinct, x+ y+ z≡ 0 mod 18} .
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Figure 6: KPS from Ramanujan expander graph construction, from [17]
For example, (1,5,12) is a hyperedge because 1+5+12≡ 0 mod 18. We assign to each hyperedge a unique key, and
each hyperedge connects three nodes. Thus the hypergraph has 46 hyperedges (keys), so there are 46×3 = 138 ‘pairs’
of links, hence
Pr1 =
138(18
2
) =≈ 0.902 ; (2)
we have tripled the connectivity. This has not been at the cost of a large reduction in resilience:
fail1 =
1
3
7
124
+
2
3
8
122
≈ 0.0625 (3)
because:
• One third of the nodes store 7 keys. On compromising one of these nodes, the adversary learns 7 keys. There
are then 138− (7×2) uncompromised links remaining, of which 7 use a key known to the adversary.
• Similarly, two thirds of the nodes store 8 keys, and compromising one of these leaves 138− (8×2) uncompro-
mised links, of which 8 are vulnerable.
We will provide a general formula for fails and prove that it has expansion ε = 8 at the end of this section, after making
a simplifying assumption.
We also note that there is a more equal spread of key storage per node in this construction than in the Ramanujan
construction from [17], that is, the key storage for node Ni is kNi ∈ {7,8}, whereas in the Ramanujan construction
kNi ∈{4,5,6}. For large networks the Cayley construction does not scale well: the key storage is≈ v−12 . Nevertheless, it
serves as a simple example of the use of a hypergraph to construct a KPS with practical trade-offs between connectivity
and resilience, as well as the benefits of good expansion.
But of course this is not entirely surprising. A hypergraph is a set system, and an r-uniform, k-regular hypergraph
H = (V,E) can be regarded as the representation of a k-uniform, r-regular design, whose incidence matrix is the
transpose of the incidence matrix of H. Thus, our construction bears a strong resemblance to a combinatorial design,
and the effectiveness of designs as constructions for KPSs is well established.
To recover the set system to which our Cayley hypergraph on 18 nodes corresponds, we generate the 46× 18
incidence matrix M, where each row corresponds to a hyperedge and each column corresponds to a key. Thus, reading
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Figure 7: Cayley hypergraph
down each column gives the key set of each node, and we recover the set system (X ,B) whereX = {01,02, . . . ,46}
and the blocks ofB are:
{01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08}, {01,09,10,11,12,13,14,15}, {02,09,16,17,18,19,20},
{03,10,16,21,22,23,24,25}, {04,11,17,21,26,27,28}, {05,12,18,22,26,29,30,31},
{06,13,19,23,27,29,32,33}, {07,14,20,24,29,34,35,36}, {08,15,24,27,37,38,39},
{15,20,23,26,40,41,42,43}, {08,14,19,22,40,44,45}, {07,13,18,21,37,41,44,46},
{06,12,17,34,38,42,45,46}, {05,11,16,32,35,39,43,46}, {04,10,30,33,36,43,45},
{03,09,28,31,36,39,42,44}, {02,25,31,33,35,38,41}, {01,25,28,30,32,34,37,40}.
Then (X ,B) is a design, regular of degree three, with rank eight. Notice that it is not uniform, as some blocks have
seven points. However, if we simply add the hyperedges {2,8,14} and {4,10,16} to our Cayley hypergraph, we have
a 3-uniform, 8-regular hypergraph, corresponding to an 8-uniform, 3-regular design. (These additional hyperedges are
picked using the six nodes which have degree seven, and assigning hyperedges so that no pair of nodes is incident to
more than one hyperedge.) Explicitly, we would have the design (X ,B) whereX = {01,02, . . . ,48} and the blocks
ofB are:
{01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08}, {01,09,10,11,12,13,14,15}, {02,09,16,17,18,19,20,47},
{03,10,16,21,22,23,24,25}, {04,11,17,21,26,27,28,48}, {05,12,18,22,26,29,30,31},
{06,13,19,23,27,29,32,33}, {07,14,20,24,29,34,35,36}, {08,15,24,27,37,38,39,47},
{15,20,23,26,40,41,42,43}, {08,14,19,22,40,44,45,48}, {07,13,18,21,37,41,44,46},
{06,12,17,34,38,42,45,46}, {05,11,16,32,35,39,43,46}, {04,10,30,33,36,43,45,47},
{03,09,28,31,36,39,42,44}, {02,25,31,33,35,38,41,48}, {01,25,28,30,32,34,37,40}.
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Notice that this is not a 2− (48,8,1) design, since, for example, it can easily be checked that points 1 and 16 do
not appear in the same block. However, it is a configuration (Definition 6), and for each block Bi there is exactly one
block B j with which it does not share any keys, i.e. Bi ∩B j = /0. Thus, Bi and B j have 16 common neighbours, and
so this is a 16-common intersection design. Further, for every Bi and B j with Bi ∩B j 6= /0, there are λ = 14 common
neighbours, and thus this is a (18,16,14,16) strongly regular graph. We have already established that strongly regular
graphs make good constructions for KPSs in Section 3.3.2, and in particular Lemma 4 gives
ε ≥ 8− (14−16)+
√
(14−16)2+4×0
4
= 8 .
By inspection we can find a subset of vertices S with |S|= 9 and |E(S,S)|= 72, giving ε ≤ 8, hence ε = 8 which shows
that our proposed KPS construction does have good expansion.
Indeed, it is shown in [9] that if there exists a (v,k(r−1),λ ,µ)-strongly regular graph for a given set of parameters
v, k, r, λ , µ , and if
v≤ 2k(r−1)−λ
and
λ ≥ 1
2
(
λ −µ+
√
(λ −µ)2+4(k(r−1)−µ)
)
,
then that strongly regular graph maximizes the algebraic connectivity, hence ε , amongst all k(r−1)-regular graphs. In
our example we have v = 18 = 2×8×2−14 and λ = 14 > 0, and so we can conclude that our example has optimal
expansion amongst all 16-regular graphs.
Finally, we find the connectivity and resilience of this strongly regular graph KPS. By observation,
Pr1 =
144(18
2
) ≈ 0.941, (4)
and
fail1 =
8
128
=
1
16
= 0.0625. (5)
Thus, by adding the extra two edges, the connectivity has increased from approximately 0.902 to 0.941 (Equations (2)
and Equation (4)), and the resilience has fractionally improved: the difference between Equation (3) and Equation (5)
is ≈ 0.000033.
Calculating fail2 using conditional probabilities, we find that
fail2 =
1
17
(
8
128
+
8
112
)
+
16
17
(
8
128
+
7
113
)
= 0.125005 (6)
because: suppose the adversary has compromised one node, which without loss of generality we will call N1, and so the
adversary has learned key setKN1 . Now there is one node Ni out of the remaining 17 nodes for whichKN1
⋂
KNi = /0,
that is, one node which would reveal 8 further keys to the adversary. Compromising any of the other 16 nodes reveals
exactly 7 new keys, as |KN1
⋂
KN j |= 1 for all 2≤ j ≤ 18, j 6= i.
In [43] the following formula is given as an estimate for the resilience of a KPS composed of l copies of a strongly
regular graph:
fails = 1−
(v−l−2
s
)(v−2
s
) . (7)
Table 1 gives the exact values of Equation (7) for our extended Cayley hypergraph (l = 1) for s = 1, . . . ,15, and we see
that it agrees exactly with Equation (5) and approximately with Equation (6).
Table 1 shows that fails increases steadily with s. In particular, fails = 0.5 when s= v2−1. As a point of comparison,
the resilience of an Eschenauer Gligor scheme [18, 37] is given by
fails = 1−
(
1− k
n
)s
.
Thus an Eschenauer Gligor scheme which also has fail1 = 0.0625 has parameters kn =
1
16 , and this proportion gives
fails > 0.5 for s≥ 11. Indeed, for each s, the Eschenauer Gligor value of fails with kn = 116 is smaller than the approxi-
mate value of fails for the extended Cayley hypergraph KPS given by Equation (7).
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s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
fails 0.0625 0.125 0.1875 0.25 0.3125 0.375 0.4375 0.5
s 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
fails 0.5625 0.625 0.6875 0.75 0.8125 0.875 0.9375
Table 1: Resilience of the extended Cayley hypergraph
However, if we make a comparison based on key storage and size of key pool, that is, fixing k = 8 and n = 48,
we find that the KPS based on an extended Cayley hypergraph performs better, since the Eschenauer Gligor KPS has
lower connectivity: Pr1 ≈ 0.796, and poorer resilience: fail1 ≈ 0.167 and fails > 0.5 for s≥ 4.
In summary, although the extended Cayley hypergraph / strongly regular graph construction for a KPS does not
scale well, it does provide good expansion, a lower bound for which can be easily found, and there are combinations
of parameters k and n for which it outperforms the Eschenauer Gligor KPS.
4.3 Analysis using the incidence and concurrence graphs
Finally, we demonstrate how alternative graphical representations of a KPS allow us to perform further analysis. We
introduce one more graph which can be used to represent a design, called the concurrence graph.
Definition 11 (from [3]). The concurrence graph of a design is defined in the following way. Each vertex corresponds
to a point (or key), and distinct vertices are joined by γi, j edges, where γi, j is the concurrence of Ki and K j, that is,
γi, j := |{Ba ∈B : {Ki,K j} ⊆ Ba}| .
In other words, γi, j is the number of blocks containing keys Ki and K j.
Notice that the concurrence graph is not necessarily a simple graph: there are no self-loops, but multiple edges
may occur between a pair of vertices. However, the concurrence graph of a configuration is simple: recall that any two
points occur in at most one block in a configuration, and that this maximises the degree of the design (Lemma 1). The
concurrence graph of the 2− (9,3,1) configuration from Section 4.1.2 is therefore the complete graph on nine vertices.
In the context of KPSs, the concurrence graph helps us to understand the re-use of keys throughout the network.
In particular, a concurrence of γi, j > 1 indicates that keys Ki and K j are both known to more than one node. Let Bi, j
be the set of γi, j nodes storing keys Ki and K j. Generally speaking, with limited key storage and connectivity, γi, j > 1
is undesirable for resilience: we would rather that a common neighbour of the set Bi, j is connected to each node of
Bi, j using a different key, as illustrated by the simple example in Figure 8(a), where we consider the keys K1 and K2,
known to nodes N3 and N4. Node N1 knows key K1, and is therefore a common neighbour of N3 and N4. Compromise
of N1 means that the adversary will learn keys K1, K5 and K6, and thus know the key securing 13 of the remaining
connections. In contrast, node N2 is connected to N3 and N4 using keys K3 and K4 respectively, so compromise of node
N2 leaves all remaining connections secure against an adversary.
The corresponding concurrence graph is given in Figure 8(b), and the incidence graph in Figure 8(c) for reference.
Roughly speaking, it seems as if a more even spread of edges in the concurrence graph might correspond to a more
optimal KPS. These ideas have been formalised and studied in the theory of optimal designs for statistical experiments
and networks using the three measures of A-, D- and E-optimality. We refer the reader to [3, 4, 5, 22] for more details.
Currently, little is known about these optimality criteria for designs with block size k > 2 or n > 20, so the results
may be of limited use to KPS applications. We therefore present only a brief summary of these measures, seeking to
highlight that future research in this area could have great impact on KPSs.
Definition 12. Let θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ·· · ≤ θv−1 be the non-trivial eigenvalues of the Laplacian of a design. For chosen values
of v, b and k, a design is said to be
• A-optimal if it maximises the harmonic mean of θ1,θ2, . . . ,θv−1;
• D-optimal if it maximises the geometric mean of θ1,θ2, . . . ,θv−1;
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Figure 8: Corresponding block intersection, incidence and concurrence graphs
• E-optimal if it maximises the value of θ1 .
The following correspondences are collated from [3, 4]:
• A-optimality corresponds to minimising the pairwise effective resistances between all pairs of vertices, when the
concurrence graph (similarly, the incidence graph) is viewed as an electrical network with one ohm resistance on
each edge
• D-optimality corresponds to maximising the number of spanning trees in the concurrence graph and hence the
incidence graph
• E-optimality corresponds to good expansion in the concurrence and incidence graphs
Thus, satisfying any of these optimality criteria is a good indicator of a strong KPS, with short average paths
lengths, many paths between pairs of vertices, limited re-use of keys (lack of multi-edges in the concurrence graph)
and a lack of bottlenecks. It seems very likely that progress in the area of classifying optimal designs will be useful
for KPS research, either providing further support for the choice of existing combinatorial design-based KPSs, or
suggesting new classes of designs for KPSs.
5 Conclusion and directions for further research
We have shown some of the many ways in which graph theory can be used to support the design and analysis of
KPSs. Developing the ideas from [38], we have argued that a large expansion coefficient is desirable for the block
intersection graph of a KPS, and that many existing schemes, including random KPSs and those based on µ-common
intersection designs and strongly regular graphs, do provide good expansion. In Section 4 we suggested alternative
graphical representations of KPSs, namely the incidence graph and the concurrence graph, and demonstrated how they
can help us to analyse and design KPSs in new ways.
There are currently few constructions for hypergraphs which approach the optimal proven bounds for expansion.
We have reasoned that any future constructions proposed for hypergraphs with good expansion are likely to correspond
to good constructions for KPSs. However, we have noted that hypergraphs are set systems, and it is possible that any
such construction may already be established in the literature as a combinatorial design. Indeed, since combinatorial
designs are hypergraphs, our results in Section 3 about the expansion of configurations, µ-common intersection designs
and strongly regular graphs support the claims of Section 4.
It seems possible that the problem of finding a construction for random uniform hypergraphs with good expansion
may be related to the problem of finding random strongly regular graphs, as discussed in [33] and [12] respectively, and
that solving either problem may lead to a good construction for a KPS. We note that in [41], Lanphier et al. consider
expansion in the Levi (incidence) graph of symmetric block designs. They use vertex expansion, but it seems likely
that a similar method could find bounds for the edge expansion, and/or the research on expanding hypergraphs could
be adapted to consider vertex expansion, so that comparisons might be made.
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Finally, we briefly introduced optimality criteria in Section 4.3. We argued that further research on A-, D- and
E-optimal designs is likely to lead to further insights into KPSs, and suggest the following open questions for consid-
eration:
• The work on expansion in KPSs is most closely linked with E-optimality. Are A-, D- and E-optimality equally
important for KPSs, or is there one which should be prioritised?
• Which are the A-, D- and E-optimal designs for practical values of k, v and n for KPSs?
• Could another optimality criterion be defined which precisely captures the important features needed for a KPS?
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